Abstract-We build a model for the kind of decision making involved in games of strategy such as chess, making it abstract enough to remove essentially all game-specific contingency, and compare it to known psychometric models of test taking, item response, and performance assessment. Decisions are modeled in terms of fallible agents Z faced with possible actions a i whose utilities ui = u(ai) are not fully apparent. The three main goals of the model are prediction, meaning to infer probabilities pi for Z to choose ai; intrinsic rating, meaning to assess the skill of a person's actual choices ai t over various test items t; and simulation of the distribution of choices by an agent with a specified skill set. We describe and train the model on large data from chess tournament games of different ranks of players, and exemplify its accuracy by applying it to give intrinsic ratings for world championship matches.
I. INTRODUCTION
In most applications of rational-choice theory to human decision making, the true or expected values and costs of actions are presumed to be known or knowable to the actors. The goal may be to find the set of choices that maximize (expected) utility values of benefits minus costs, or to resolve competing desires between actors. Alternately, the actors may express preferences that are taken as givens, and the goal is to determine a group preference. In bounded rationality, however, the true values are unknown, or may be too complex to obtain within a feasible timespan, and preferences may be based on fallacious perceived values.
We work in a bounded-rationality setting where "true values" are given by design, hindsight, or reasonable authority. This enables further goals of assessing an actor's past performance once the values come to light, and predicting future performance based on past record of finding optimal actions. This includes assessing the natural frequency of tangible mistakes even by the top performers-how often does "Homer nod"?
Test-taking is a prominent setting of this kind. The values of answer choices to questions are known by design. Often the values are binary (one choice correct, the rest wrong), but prescription of partial credits may lend an informative numerical value and ranking to every possible choice. The test taker-at least an honest one-does not know the values, and is graded on ability to find the best answers. Another is game-play, where either the results of moves are generally too complex to determine fully (as in chess) or may also depend on unknown chance allotments (as in bridge and poker). Where authoritative values of decision choices are unobtainable, owing to complexity or dependence on particulars of the opponents (such as bluffing in poker), the results of the actions-who wins the game or hand and by how muchfurnish natural performance metrics.
The modeling in the paper marries the test-taking and game-playing settings. The elements are sets of decision events specified by available options and their authoritative values unknown to the actor, and internal parameters of the actor. Recent advances in computer chess playing programs enable one to obtain reliable values for the move options in chess positions on a large scale. Values given by the computer at different search depths, and other features in the data, may also enable measures of "difficulty" or "challenge" without requiring reference to chess notions such as attack, sacrifice, initiative, traps, and the like.
An old example of this marriage is a feature commonly called "Solitaire Chess" in newspapers or magazines 1 : The writer prescribes point values for various moves in the positions faced by the successful player in a recorded game, often but not always giving top value to the move that was played. The reader plays through the game (without peeking ahead), and in each indicated position selects the move he/she would play. Then the reader reveals the played move and points scoring and continues until the next position. At the end the reader's points total is scored on a scale determined by the preparer, for instance 150 points for "grandmaster," 120 for "master," 100 for "expert" and so on. This could be done with any set of chess positions used as a test, but having them come from one side in one game increases the popular element of "being in the game" and executing strategies across positions. The technical results of this and previous papers [1] , [2] can be viewed as furnishing scientific scoring based on actual games played by grandmasters, masters, experts and so on, for evaluating moves made under real competition rather than "solitaire" or in simulations.
From the side of test-taking and related item-response theories [3] , [4] , [5] , our work is an extension of Rasch modeling [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] for polytomous items [10], [11] , [12] , [13] , with similar mathematical ingredients (cf. [14] , [15] ). Rasch modeling has two main kinds of parameters, person and item parameters. These are often abstracted into the single parameters of actor location (or "ability") and item difficulty. The formulas in Rasch modeling enable predicting distributions of responses to items based on differences in these parameters. 2 Our basic model has two person parameters called s for sensitivity and c for consistency. It employs a function E(s, c), determined by regression from training data, mapping them to the standard Elo rating scale for chess players. The numbers on this scale have only relative significance but have arguably remained stable ever since its formal adoption in 1971 by the World Chess Federation (FIDE). The threshold for "master" is almost universally regarded as 2200 on this scale, with 2500 serving as a rating threshold for initial award of the title of Grandmaster, and 2000 called "Expert" in the Unites States. The current world champion, Viswanathan Anand, sports a rating of 2786, while top-ranked Magnus Carlsen's recent peak of 2872 is 21 points higher than the previous record of 2851 by former world champion Garry Kasparov. Computer programs running on consumer-level personal computers are, however, reliably estimated to reach into the 3200s, high enough that no human player has been backed to challenge a computer on even terms since then-world champion Vladimir Kramnik (currently 2803) lost a match in December 2006 to the Deep Fritz 10 program running on a quad-core PC. This fact has raised the ugly eventuality of human cheating with computers during games, but also furnishes the reliable values for available move options that constitute the only chess-dependent input to the model.
Our main departure from Rasch modeling is that these "hindsight utility values" are used to infer probabilities for each available response, without recourse to a measure of difficulty on the same rating scale. That is, we have no prior notion of "a position of Grandmaster-level difficulty," or "expert difficulty," or "beginning difficulty" per-se. Chess problems, such as White to checkmate in two moves or Black to move and win, are commonly rated for difficulty of solution, but the criteria are specialized. Instead we aim to infer difficulty from the expected loss of utility from that of the optimal move, and separately from other features of the computer-analysis data itself. Hence we propose a separate name for our paradigm: "Converting Utilities Into Probabilities."
The next sections attempt to formulate this paradigm abstractly, with minimal reference to chess. The main departure from skill rating in games [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] is that the game result has no primary significance. A player may win a poorly played game through an opponent's blunder, or play heroically to save a draw which brings only a half-point reward. Shifting the scoring to individual move-decisions factors out the opponent's quality, and also multiplies the sample size by a large factor. A chess player may contest only 50 professional games in a given year, but these games may furnish 1,500 significant move decisions, even after discounting opening moves regarded as "book knowledge" and positions where one side has an overwhelming advantage. The upshot is to create a statistically robust formulation of "Intrinsic Performance Ratings" expressed on the standard Elo scale [1] , [2] . This paper aims to abstract this kind of decision-based assessment, identifying general features not dependent on chess. This will promote outside applications, such as intrinsic scoring of grades on tests with less reliance on either prior notions of difficulty or posterior "curving" after results are in. We do not achieve this here, but we demonstrate the richness and efficacy of our modeling paradigm. We show how it embraces both values and preference ranks, lends itself to multiple statistical fitting techniques that act as checks on each other, and gives consistent and intelligible results in the chess domain. Finally we discuss applying it toward more realistic simulation of fallible human game play.
II. CONVERTING UTILITIES INTO PROBABILITIES
We are given a set T of decision events t, such as game turns in a chess game. Each event is specified by a list of some number � of available options a 1 , . . . , a � known to the actor, and a list of values U t = (u 1 , . . . , u � ) of these actions that are not conveyed to the actor. The actor's skill at the game can informally be regarded as the degree to which he or she (or it-we can model fallible software agents the same way) perceives the authoritative values from situational information I t (such as a chess position, or study notes for a test), and thereby selects the best option. That is to say, for any item t:
(a) Both the actor Z and the model are given a description of t and the options a 1 , . . . , a � .
(b) The actor draws on experience and situational information I t but does not know the values U t .
(c) The model is given U t , but does not use any application-specific information I t .
(d) The model is either given values of the parameters � z = z 1 , z 2 , . . . defining proclivities of the actor Z, or has inferred such values from training data. The model's task is to infer probabilities P (� z) = (p 1 , . . . , p � ) for the actor Z to choose the respective options for the decision event t. We suppose that the labeling of moves is in nonincreasing order of the utilities given to the model, i.e., such that u 1 ≥ u 2 ≥ · · · ≥ u � . We may also suppose that the number � is the same for all turns t, by padding turns with r < � stated options to have � − r phantom options, each of "negatively infinite" value. Henceforth when we formally identify the actor Z with the probabilistic behavior mapping P (� z), we call this defining a fallible computational agent, along lines of [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] .
In a simple rational-choice situation with perfect information about utility, and ignoring for now the possibility of two or more actions with equal best value, we would project p i = 1 for the action a i with highest u i , and p j = 0 for all other actions. In real-world situations of bounded rationality, however, we may expect to see substantial probability on a variety of reasonable options, and also on poor but deceptively attractive options. Can we model this so that over sufficiently many turns t at which an action must be chosen, and given parameters z quantifying the ability of Z to perceive the stipulated values u i , we can make accurate projections of aggregate statistics? Here are three such statistics:
(a) Best-Choice frequency (BC). On a multiple-choice test, this is the score without partial credit, expressed as a percentage. In chess it is the frequency of move agreements with the computer; it is called MM in [1] .
(b) Aggregate Error (AE). On an exam with partial credit, this is the total number of points lost. In chess it is the sum, over all moves (where the computer judges the player chose an inferior move), of the difference in value between the optimal move and the chosen one. Chess programs standardly give these values in units of centipawns-figuratively hundredths of a pawn, whereupon AE represents the total number of pawns "lost" by the players in the set of positions t. Where there is no confusion we also use AE for the per-move average error.
(c) Ordinal Ranks (OR). Besides the BC frequency f 1 , these give the frequency f 2 of choosing the secondbest option, f 3 for third-best, f 4 for fourth-best, and so on. Of course there may be no parity between secondbest choices: some may be "close" while others are large errors. Projections of OR may take the difference in value into account, so that it is permissible to mix these kinds of data points. Likewise permissible is to assume all turns have the same number � of options, padding those having fewer with "dummy options" having large negative values, which will translate to essentially-zero probability in projections.
Note that OR entails indexing choices by their values:
Also note that the projected probabilities p t,i over t ∈ T alone suffice to generate projected values for these statistics, namelyb
To sum up, the paradigm is to have a function P of the personal parameters � z and the utility values u t,i . The personal parameters are assumed to be the same for all t in a given test-set T . The output P (� z, { u t,i }) is a matrix (p t,i ) giving for each decision event t the probabilities for choosing each of the options. A particular function P denotes an applicationspecific model within the paradigm.
Several reasonable axioms simplify and constrain the permissible functions P .
A. Axioms and Confidence Intervals
The first two axiomatic properties can be considered desirable, but the third has some questionable entailments.
(i) Independence. For all t, the generated values (p t,1 , . . . , p t,� ) depend only on (u t,1 , . . . , u t,� ) and � z.
(ii) Extensionality of utility. For all t and Z, u t,i = u t,j =⇒ p t,i = p t,j .
(iii) Monotonicity. For all t and i, if u t,i is replaced by a greater value u � , then for all Z, p
Note that (iii) is different from saying that always p t,1 ≥ p t,2 ≥ · · · ≥ p t,� , though that follows from (ii) and (iii) as-stated. The reason for doubting (iii) is the application to Z of all skill levels-it says that improving the hindsight quality of an answer makes it no less attractive, which runs counter to the idea in chess that "weaker players prefer weaker moves." One reason independence is desirable is that it yields inherent standard deviations and hence confidence intervals for projections of these statistics, in particular:
One way of attempting to cope with having less than full independence is to regard the effective sample size |T | as having shrunk, and hence to widen the inferred error bars by a corresponding factor. Empirical runs in the chess application [2] have suggested a 1.15 multiplier for σ BC and a 1.4 multiplier for σ AE . These factors also represent allowance for modeling error.
III. TRAINING DATA AND FITTING METRICS
Every piece of training data is an item
where i is the index of the option that was chosen, and e gives supplementary information about the person or agent who made the choice. In examinations, e may be prior information about past grades or test results, or alternatively may be posterior information such as the overall score on the exam itself. In chess, e can be the Elo rating of the player making the move. We index an item and its components by the turn t, and sometimes write just t in place of I, calling the item a tuple.
In this paper we postulate a mapping E(Z) from the agent space to the values e that come with the training data. This mapping need not be invertible-indeed when two or more scalar parameters comprise � z this is not expected. Its main point is that when regressing on a subset of items whose values e are all equal (or close to equal) to obtain z, comparing E(z) and e acts as a check on the results. They need not be equalperhaps E itself has been fitted by a final linear regression against e and the particular e is an outlier in this fit-but lack of closeness is a reason to doubt the method used to fit z.
When the estimation method does not guarantee that the projected means agree with the sample means, for BC and AE in particular, then the difference from the sample becomes a measure of goodness (or rather badness) of fit. We express the deviations from the sample means as multiples of the inherently projected standard deviations, that is as multiples of σ BC and σ AE . Technically this assumes independence of turns, but this assumption is not a strong consideration because we are not using them to infer z-scores for hypothesis tests. They are mainly a convenient choice of units when comparing results between training sets of different sizes.
Our main independent metric for goodness of fit involves the projected ordinal frequenciesf k for 1 ≤ k ≤ � and the sample values f k . The ordinal rank fit (ORF) is given by
In tables, the frequencies are expressed as percentagesequivalently, the ORF score is multiplied by 10,000. We do not weight ORF by the number of items with i = k (i.e., by f k itself), but we consider a fitting method that tries to minimize this score.
The metrics and training and fitting methods all extend naturally when items I t for different turns t are given different weights w t . The weight w t may represent some measure of the value or difficulty of the decision. Our experiments in the basic model reported here use unit weights.
IV. FITTING METHODS
In all cases we are given training data consisting of items. Since the data are fixed, we can regard the probabilities p t,j as functions of Z alone.
A. MLE and Bayes
Maximum Likelihood Estimation fits � z to maximize the probability of the selected options i t in the training data. By independence this means to maximize � t p t,it , which is equivalent to minimizing the log-sum
We write z M L for some value of Z that minimizes this log-sum, and call P (z M L ) the max-likelihood probabilities. Bayesian methods likewise apply, and were introduced for chess by Haworth [25] , [26] .
For completeness, we derive the result that Bayesian iteration approaches the ML estimator in this setting. Let A(z) denote the event that the agent in the training data with chosen options � i = i 1 , i 2 , . . . arises from Z = z. By Bayes' Theorem, assuming the space Z is finite,
.
The standard "know-nothing prior" assumption Pr(A(z)) = 1/|Z| lets us simplify this even further to
Note that the global independence assumption not only creates a simple product over t but also makes the value independent of the order of presentation of the data for each t. Thus the Bayesian probability of Z = z is just the normalized likelihood function.
Write N z for � t p t,it (z). Upon iterating the data d times, we get Thus the peaks of the Bayesian probability curves approach the ML estimators. Large homogeneous training sets can be expected to behave like d-fold iterations of a smaller training set. Note that in both cases, only the probabilities of the selected options a t,it are involved in the formulas. The ordinal information in i t is not used. At least in this formulation, it seems that the MLE and Bayesian approaches are not using all available information.
We move on to simple frequentist approaches. We define d(x, y) to be (the square of) a distance function, not necessarily supposing d(x, y) = (x − y) 2 for use with least-squares estimation. Since there is no notion of "same outcome," the issue becomes how best to preserve the intuition of building frequencies for the outcomes. One idea is to impose a percentile grid on them.
B. Percentile Fitting
The "Percentile Fitting" method of [1] attempts to avoid these choices and weighting issues. The method is to minimize a distance integral of the form
where f q (z) is the hit score for percentile q defined as follows. The hit score is the average of the hit scores for each tuple t, so suppressing t we need only define f q (z) for one vector of projected probabilities P (z) = (p 1 (z), p 2 (z), . . . , p � (z)). Here is where the fixed ordering of outcomes is used. Let i = i t be the selected outcome for that tuple. Define
Here is the frequentist intuition. Consider any fixed value of q, say q = 0.60, and consider any projected tuple (p 1 (z), p 2 (z), . . . , p � (z) ). The parameter(s) z represent a way of stretching or compressing sub-intervals of width p k (z) in the unit interval. Let us suppose first that q is exactly at the upper end of interval p k , meaning that p 1 (z)+p 2 (z)+· · ·+p k (z) = q. Then we interpret z as representing the assertion that the probability of one of the first k options being chosen is exactly q. That is to say, if i ≤ k then we call the tuple a "hit," else it is a "miss." So this particular z is asserting that the probability of a hit is q, and that is the z that we wish to find.
If q sits midway inside interval p k , then we must consider how to score z in the case i = k. To interpolate correctly, let b be the ratio of the real-number distance of q from the left end of the interval to its width p k . Then score this case as b of a hit. Thus z and q represent the assertion that the expected hit score for the tuple at percentile q is none other than q itself.
For each z and q, this prescription defines a criterion for scoring a hit for each tuple, and asserts that this expectation is q. Since the expectation is the same for each tuple, we have intuitively achieved the effect of the simple-frequency case, and can aggregate over the tuples. The frequency function f q (z) defined above tabulates the actual hit scores from the data. The degree of fit given by z for percentile q is then quantified as the distance between q itself and f q (z).
Treating q itself as a continuous parameter leads to minimizing the above integral. The one arbitrary choice we see is whether this should be weighted in terms of q. Minimizing
instead is natural because having H(0) = H(1) = 0 reinforces the idea that the hit percentage projections are automatically correct at the endpoints q = 0 and q = 1. Apart from this, our intuitive point of using percentiles is that they skirt issues of skedasticity. We abbreviate this method as PF.
C. Fitting to Equate Means for BC and AE
The projected probabilities also yield a projected utility u(z) = � j u j p j (z). This can readily be summed or averaged over all tuples. Thus one can also fit z by equating the projected u(z) with the actual utility u achieved in the training data. This is affinely related to minimizing the AE metric.
In cases where the objective is to see how often the agent makes the optimal choice, as well as modeling its average (falloff in) utility (from optimal), one can write two equations in the parameters Z. When Z comprises just two parameters, one can fit by solving two equations in two unknowns, equating u = u(z) and the first-choice hit frequency h 1 = |{ t : i t = 1 }|/T with the average of p t,1 (z). This hybrid fitting method bypasses all of the above options, and hence acts as a helpful check on them. We abbreviate this FF for "first-choice and falloff." FF is the method chosen for computing IPRs below.
D. Fitting the Ordinal Ranks
We can fit to minimize the ORF statistic, or alternatively its frequency-weighted version
For data such as ours where about half the "mass" is on index 1-that is, when the best answer or trade or chess move is found at least half the time (at least when items have unit weights)-the latter policy is a compromise on simply solving to make the BC projection agree with the sample mean. The compromise policy avoids over-fitting, and avoids heteroskedasticity issues with ORF itself. Minimizing ORF emphasizes the importance of getting accurate projections for the "tail" of the distribution of choices: bad mistakes on exams or "blunders" at chess.
V. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In case the parameter space for Z allows a dense set of probability vectors, the simple case of repeated data (or equal utility vectors) allows exact fitting, and gives the same optimal z under any method.
Theorem 5.1: Percentile Fitting agrees with Maximum Likelihood for homogeneous data and free parameterization of probabilities.
Proof: Take f 1 , . . . , f � to be the frequencies from the data. The log-sum minimand for MLE then becomes
This is known to be minimized by setting p j (z) = f j for each j, in accordance with the basic frequency idea, and the freedom assumption on z allows this to be realized. It remains to show that PF achieves the same minimum z.
For this z, let q be any percentile. If q falls on the endpoint r of any interval
Since other values of q occupy the same medial position in the same interval over all of the equal tuples, the interpolation gives f q (z) = q for all q, so the PF minimand is zero.
, so the FF equations hold.
A. Differences Among MLE/Bayes and PF
Now we give an example showing that this equivalence can be disturbed by constraining the parameters. Indeed it seems to be the simplest example that can possibly show a difference. Let each tuple have outcomes m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , and let the probabilities be given by p 1 (z) = p 2 (z) = z, p 3 (z) = 1 − 2z, with one numerical parameter z ∈ [0, 1]. Consider training data with t = 2 equal tuples, in which m 1 and m 3 are chosen once each. The ML maximand is z(1 − 2z) and is maximized at z = 1/4.
Percentile fitting gives a different answer, however. The PF minimand is a three-piece integral. The first piece integrates d(q, 
VI. APPLICATION MODEL AND EXPERIMENTAL DOMAIN
Chess has been a popular experimental domain for many studies aspiring to have more general significance. Here are several reasons pertaining in particular to the prior work [27] , [28] , [1] : 1) Chess games and results are public-there are no copyright or privacy considerations. 2) The decisions are taken under conditions of actual competition, not simulations.
3) The human subjects have similar training and backgrounds, and the games have no systematic or substantial outside influences (put another way, the modeling can be free of "nuisance terms"). 4) There is a well-defined skill metric, namely the chess Elo rating system. 5) The utility values are assigned by a recognized humanneutral authority, namely the champion chess program Rybka 3 [29] . 6) The data sets are unique-comprising all games recorded between players with ratings e near the same Elo century mark in official chess events under "standard individual tournament conditions" in a specified time period. There is no arbitrariness of choosing data from certain kinds of exams or kinds of financial markets. 7) The data sets and statistical analyzing code are freely available by request, though they are not (yet) public. 8) The training sets each contain over 5,000 data points, some over 20,000.
To reprise some details from [1] , [2] , the defining equation of the particular model used there and here is the following, which relates the probability p i of the i-th alternative move to p 0 for the best move and its difference in value:
, where
Here when the value v 0 of the best move and v i of the ith move have the same sign, the integral giving the scaled difference simplifies to | log(1+v 0 )−log(1+v i )|. This employs the empirically-determined logarithmic scaling law.
The skill parameters are called s for "sensitivity" and c for "consistency" because s when small can enlarge small differences in value, while c when large sharply cuts down the probability of poor moves. The equation solved directly for p i becomes
The constraint � i p i = 1 thus determines all values. By fitting these derived probabilities to actual frequencies of move choice in training data, we can find values of s and c corresponding to the training set.
Once we have s and c, these equations give us projected probabilities p i,t for every legal move m i in the position at every relevant game turn t. Per arbitrary choice we omit: game turns 1-8, turns involved in repetitions of the position, and turns where the program judges an advantage greater than 300 centipawns for either side. These and some further specific modeling decisions are given detail and justification in [1] .
VII. COMPUTING INTRINSIC PERFORMANCE RATINGS
The training data comprised all recorded games from the years 2006-2009 in standard individual-play tournaments, in which both players had current Elo ratings within 10 points of a century mark, 2200 through 2700. Table I gives the values of AE e (expected AE) that were obtained by first fitting the training data for 2006-09, to obtain s, c, then computing the expectation for the union of the training sets. It was found that a smaller set S of moves comprising the games of the world championship tournaments and matches from 2005 to 2008 gave identical results to the fourth decimal place, so S was used as the fixed "Solitaire Set." An improved way of treating potential repetitions compared to [1] , [2] A simple linear fit then yields the rule to produce the Elo rating for any (s, c), which we call an "Intrinsic Performance Rating" (IPR) when the (s, c) are obtained by analyzing the games of a particular event and player(s).
This expresses, incidentally, that at least from the vantage of RYBKA 3 run to reported depth 13, perfect play has a rating under 3500, which is only 600 points above Carlsen. This is reasonable considering that if a Carlsen can draw even once in twenty-five games against perfect play, or a 2800 player like Kramnik once in fifty, the Elo rating formula can never give it a higher rating than that.
The procedure for computing an Intrinsic Performance Rating (IPR) given a set of games by a particular player in a chess event is hence the following: 1) Analyze the player's moves in these games with one or more strong chess programs such as RYBKA. 2) Run the parameter regression on these moves to fund the best-fitting values of the player parameters s and c. 3) Use the inferred (s, c) to generate the expected averageerror for Z s,c on the fixed "Solitaire Set" S. 4) Plug the AE e value from step 3 into the equation (8) to obtain the IPR. 5) Also estimate the relative width of the error bars for AE e on S to be the same as the relative error in the AE statistic projected for the player's own moves in the given games. 6) Use the same conversion (8) to place the error bars on the same Elo scale.
The error-analysis methods of Guid and Bratko [30] , [31] neglect the importance of normalizing the AE statistic to a common reference set S. They compute AE separately for different players on their respective sets of positions. When they are facing each other in a match this may be reasonable, but when they are playing different opponents, one game may have a significantly higher expectation of error owing to lessplacid nature of its positions. The above procedure handles this issue by computing separate regressions for (s, c) and (s � , c � ) for the respective players that take the nature of their respective positions into account, and then compare the projections for the corresponding agents Z s,c and Z s � ,c � on the same positions in S. Nor do their methods provide error bars or a trained translation to the Elo rating scale at all; they themselves only justify significance of the ranking order they obtain, rather than an absolute quality scale such as Elo [32] .
